



## Moral Luck, Photojournalism, and Pornography

LUC BOVENS

*University of Colorado at Boulder, Department of Philosophy, CB 232, Boulder 80309, CO, USA*

### 1. Photojournalism: Saint or Villain?

Photojournalism was first used in an attempt to stop the atrocities in the Congo Free State under the brutal reign of the Belgian king, Leopold II, in the beginning of this century. Edmund Morel's *Red Rubber* was published with gruesome pictures of burnt villages, mutilated natives and body parts of a slaughtered child.<sup>1</sup> It was instrumental in raising the consciousness of the international community about the situation in the Free State. In 1908, the King was forced to grant the Free State a colonial charter under the authority of the Belgian government and the conditions in the newly renamed Belgian Congo improved at least somewhat.

Another influential work was Mark Twain's *King Leopold's Soliloqui*. In a speech filled with irony, he has Leopold II defend his Congo policy. Here are the words he put into Leopold II's mouth at the dawn of photojournalism:

The *kodak* has been a sore calamity to us. The most powerful enemy indeed. In the early years we had no trouble getting the press to "expose" the tales of mutilations as slanders, lies, inventions . . . and by the press's help we got the Christian nations everywhere to turn an irritated and unbelieving ear to these tales. . . . Then all of a sudden came the crash! That is to say, the incorruptible *kodak*. . . . The only witness I have encountered in my long experience that I could not bribe.<sup>2</sup>

This early optimism was borne out many times during this century. Photography and film have repeatedly been able to mobilize the international community to put a halt to human suffering at critical moments in history.

But as easy as it is to sing the praise of photojournalism, there is a lingering worry that the medium is not quite as sacrosanct as it seems. Larry Burrows, a photojournalist who was killed in Vietnam, sets his conscience at ease against this worry in the following soul-searching comments:

It's not easy to photograph a man dying in the arms of his fellow countryman. . . . Was I simply capitalizing on other men's grief? . . . I concluded that what I was doing would penetrate the hearts of those at home who are simply too indifferent. I felt that I was free to act on that condition.<sup>3</sup>

What Larry Burrows's soul-searching bears witness to is that there is a conflict of values at the heart of photojournalism. What there is to be said in favor of such a practice is all too clear. But it is much more difficult to spell out what there is to be said against such a practice. Certainly it sounds objectionable to capitalize on another person's grief. But what does this mean and what is so objectionable about it? Let us try to move beyond metaphor in giving an expression to the values that weigh against artistic representations of grief and suffering.

## 2. Kundera and Manchevski

Artists give expression to matters that are of concern to them. One such matter is the relation between art and politics. There are interesting reflections on the practice of photojournalism to be found in the novel *The Unbearable Lightness of Being* by the Czech writer Milan Kundera and the film *Before the Rain* by the Macedonian director Milcho Manchevski. I will take these works as a starting point for my own ruminations.

In *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*, Thereza documents the Soviet invasion in the Spring of Prague and passes the rolls of film on to foreign journalists who smuggle them out of the country to be published in foreign newspapers. Some months later, Thereza comes to learn that a boy was convicted for beating up a collaborator during the riots. He was identified by means of a photograph that had been published in the *Times*. Thereza is disturbed that the boy may have been convicted due to her involvement: "Walking home . . . she thought of the days she had spent photographing tanks. How naive they had been, thinking they were risking their lives for their country when in fact they were helping the Russian police."<sup>4</sup>

In *Before the Rain*, Alex, a Pulitzer-prize winning Macedonian photojournalist, decides to give up his profession after a trip to cover the war in Bosnia and resolves to return to his home country. In a letter from Macedonia to Anna, his former lover, he reveals what prompted this sudden turnaround in his life. During his stay in a camp for Bosnian prisoners of war, he befriended a Serbian guard and complained to him that there was not much happening. In response, the guard pulled a prisoner of war out of the ranks and shot him in front of Alex to supply him with some footage. Alex sees himself as an accomplice to the murder. He proclaims: "I changed, I learned, I aged,

I fucked up, I killed.”<sup>5</sup> Upon his return to Macedonia, he is reproached by Hannah, his former high school sweetheart who is ethnically Albanian, that he “does not *see*” how their village has changed, but is merely “*watching*.”<sup>6</sup> Alex decides to get personally involved and tries to save Hannah’s daughter, who got caught up in the erupting violence, but he comes to pay with his own life. The contented smile with which he enters his death appears as a personal vindication of his choice.

A striking feature that is common to both artistic works is the suggestive comparison between photojournalism and the graphic depiction of nudity. In *Before the Rain*, we see war photographs intermingled with pornographic pictures at the agency in London where Alex and Anna work. In a telephone conversation with a client who complains about an order of pornographic pictures, Anna responds: “How do you mean ‘more immediate’ – she is practically on top of you in those photographs.”<sup>7</sup> In *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*, Thereza is handed a folder of pictures of a nudist beach by the editor of a magazine with the apology: “Of course, they’re completely different from your pictures.”<sup>8</sup> Thereza makes the curious yet suggestive response: “Not at all. . . . They’re the same.”<sup>9</sup>

Kundera and Manchevski prompt interesting questions about the practice of photojournalism. What is morally disturbing about shooting pictures of war-time atrocities? There is a puzzling resemblance between photojournalism and pornography. Thereza’s dissatisfaction with photojournalism can be seen in the light of the distrust for political action that permeates much of Kundera’s work. Alex decides to abandon his career with all of its political commitments in search for a more direct personal engagement. How are we to understand this political skepticism?

### 3. Moral Luck

There is a simple but incomplete answer to explain Alex’s reaction. We might suggest that his story is not any different from a medical doctor who gives up medicine after a responsible but nonetheless ill-fated decision, or a teacher who gives up teaching after a suicide of a student in response to a deserved failing grade. It is certainly true that if the tragic event in Bosnia had not occurred, then Alex would not have turned his back on photography – at least not then and there. But there is a crucial difference. When asked about their career decisions, the medical doctor and the teacher may well respond that they have no misgivings about medical or educational practices as such, but that they simply do not want to be reminded of the tragedy that touched their lives. However, the tragedy that touched Alex’s life leads him to question the practice of photojournalism itself. His reasons for giving up his career go

beyond the desire to forget. He comes to see the world, and his place within it, as a world in which he can no longer realize anything of value through photojournalism.

In *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*, Tomas is irritated with the Communists in Czechoslovakia who try to exculpate themselves from the country's misfortunes by pointing to their ignorance of what collaboration with the Russians would lead to. He writes an article in which he draws a comparison with Sophocles' Oedipus. When Oedipus learns that he has killed his father and married his mother, he does not point to his ignorance, but pierces his eyes out to wander the streets of Thebes as a beggar. The upshot is that a morally decent person takes on a certain amount of responsibility for the unforeseen consequences of his actions and does not devote all his energy exculpating himself.

Alex is in a position similar to Oedipus. Tragedy ensues from a seemingly innocent remark and Alex certainly could not suspect how far his words would carry. The question of how far we are responsible for unforeseen consequences of our actions has come to be known in philosophy as the question of moral luck. It is a notoriously difficult question and it will prove rewarding to turn to Aquinas for inspiration.

Aquinas devotes a section of the *Summa Theologica* to the question "Whether One is Guilty of Murder through Killing Someone by Chance?"<sup>10</sup> What disturbs Aquinas is a seeming contradiction in the religious tradition. On the one hand, Augustine claims that we are not culpable for the infliction of unintentional harm. On the other hand, in traditional Jewish commentaries on Genesis 4: 23–24, Lamech accidentally kills a man on a hunt mistaking him for an animal and he is held culpable of murder, and in Exodus 21: 22–23, a man hits a pregnant woman who dies due to the complications of a miscarriage and he is held culpable of murder. Aquinas resolves the apparent contradiction by spelling out two conditions under which we are culpable for the infliction of unintentional harm: "when we do not take sufficient care" and "when we cause another's death through occupying ourselves with unlawful things that we ought to avoid."<sup>11</sup> Lamech is culpable because he did not take sufficient care. The man who caused the death of the pregnant woman by hitting her is culpable because he occupied himself with unlawful things that he ought to have avoided.

I take it that Lamech's culpability is comparable to the culpability of a drunk driver who causes the death of a child. Reckless hunting and drunk driving have foreseeable bad consequences and, if bad consequences actually do occur, then we carry a moral responsibility for them. The man who killed the pregnant woman is culpable, not so much because he should have foreseen that by hitting her, he might induce a miscarriage and that she might die as

a consequence of the miscarriage, but because his hitting her constitutes an affront to her dignity and so is an intrinsically wrong action. We carry a moral responsibility for the bad consequences of intrinsically wrong actions even if the bad consequences that ensued were barely foreseeable.

The occurrence of non-intended bad consequences carries with it a moral imperative to assess our agency. Following Aquinas, the assessment has a dual nature. First, we need to ask if we have taken sufficient care. Were we just oblivious to the foreseeable bad consequences of our agency? Second, we need to ask if our agency was unlawful. Were our actions intrinsically wrong? With respect to photojournalism, we may ask if it qualifies as a suspect practice either because it has certain foreseeable bad consequences or because it has certain features that are of intrinsic disvalue.

Unlike Aquinas, I do not want to say that if we are engaged in a suspect practice and bad consequences come about, then we are all-out culpable. Our agency may have certain redeeming features such that a verdict of all-out culpability is not warranted. But nonetheless, there would be some ground on which to rest a case for culpability. Compare the predicament of Alex and Thereza with the kind of scenario that Augustine presumably had in mind. As I open up a window of my lecture room, a bee flies in and stings a student who dies due to an allergic reaction. Neither of Aquinas' criteria are met in this case. I may feel *regret* about having opened the window. But feeling *culpable* would be a sign of pathology. There would be no ground upon which to rest a case for culpability. Certainly I could not foresee such a tragic course of events. Nor is there any intrinsic disvalue to opening up a window. But if photojournalism has foreseeable bad consequences or displays features that are of intrinsic disvalue, then, following Aquinas, there is some ground upon which to rest a case for culpability. Alex's and Thereza's feelings of culpability would not be signs of pathology. Whether such considerations tip the scale in favor of an all-out judgment of culpability is still a different matter.

#### 4. Foreseeable Bad Consequences

What forces does a photojournalist set into action? Here are some broad categories of bad consequences that a photojournalist will typically have to reckon with.

(a) *Desensitization*: There is the commonplace of the desensitizing effect of everyday exposure to violence through the media. A new generation of people is coming of age who do not care to turn their heads in the face of the most graphic depictions of atrocities, which should make us wonder what difference this will make to the future of political and military decision-making.

(b) *Use and Abuse*: The use of photographic material in the political arena is out of the hands of the photographer. In the mid-seventies, there was a sham surrounding a photograph depicting the pitiful faces of Amsterdam kindergartners just coming out of a pool and wrapped in black-and-white striped bath towels. The photograph was published by a West German Christian newspaper in a rough-grained version accompanying an article about institutions for young children who were forcefully separated from their families in Communist East Germany. Photographs may not lie, but with the right captions and background story they can surely be made to support lies. Thereza's photographs were meant to alert the world to the brutality of the Russian invasion of Prague. The world cared only for the briefest time and instead the photographs came to be used by the Russian secret police to turn against the Czechoslovakian resistance itself.

(c) *Participant Status*: The photographer may aim to remain an outsider in order not to jeopardize the objectivity of his report but, as Alex found, his very presence may affect the dynamics of the situation that he is reporting on. The violence may be suppressed, may erupt, or may be guided into different channels. The photographer may have gained access to a conflict in some way or other. His presence may add legitimacy to one of the factions and can have an impact for the worse or for the better. It is disturbing to have so little say over the consequences of being assigned the role of a player in the field. The Macedonian Alex and the Bosnian Serb guard that he befriends in the prisoner-of-war camp are both ethnically Christian Orthodox. There is a hidden suggestion that their common roots helped Alex gain access to the camp. If so, he is no longer an outsider and it is upon him to assess what difference his presence might make to the situation in the camp.

## 5. Intrinsic Disvalue

Are there certain features about the practice of photojournalism that are objectionable independently of their effects on the world?

(a) *Dignity*: What first comes to mind is a Kantian point. There has been a repeated outcry against certain pictures in Yad Va Shem, the Jerusalem holocaust museum, in which Russian Jews were photographed nude while they were being lined up for execution. The response to this outcry is that it is crucial to include such realistic depictions of the holocaust lest the world forget. I do not want to take a position in this controversy. But it is important to see the values that are at stake. People typically consider it to be a violation of their dignity to be portrayed nude, or in moments of extreme vulnerability. Hence, there is a presumption that they do not want to be so portrayed. The photographer engages the victims portrayed in the photographs in his project

of keeping the memory of the holocaust alive, while there is a presumption that the victims would not want to lend themselves to this purpose. As such, the photographer does not respect the victims as autonomous beings. He treats them not as ends in themselves, but merely as means to some further goal, however laudable the goal may be.

(b) *Sanctity*: Sacred objects are objects that are not to be used beyond a particular realm. A committed Christian will refuse to use a Bible as a table support. A committed patriot will refuse to use the flag of his country as a dishrag. The usage of these objects may extend the strict usage for which they were intended, but a person who is respectful of them will refuse to use them unless some story can be told that makes them in some way or other truthful to their intentions. For instance, it may be appropriate to carry a Bible in the left vest pocket to join the ranks of people who claim to have been saved from a bullet wound by a Bible, or to use a flag as a bandage for a wounded soldier.

Certain events may have the same aura of sanctity about them. A close friend of mine died of cancer in a Catholic hospital. He had become so weak that there was a good chance that a morphine shot would cause him to sleep into his death. This is an excellent example to illustrate the doctrine of double effect which stems from Catholic roots and permits life-shortening painkillers but not lethal injections on standard interpretations. I routinely use this example in introductory ethics classes, yet cannot suppress a sense of awkwardness. The issue is not whether my friend would object. He might have been a proponent of the doctrine of double effect and have urged me on his deathbed to tell generations of ethics students to come about the role of morphine in his death. This would make little difference to my sense of awkwardness. But then what is it that engenders the sense of awkwardness?

There are two issues at stake. First, the sanctity of my friend's death carries with it an imperative that it not be presented in some mediated form, *in casu*, as a classroom example. His death is only to be approached through the most personal channels by me. Turning his death into a classroom example strikes me as a betrayal of our friendship. The resistance that at least some of us continue to feel against videotaping births, baptisms, or weddings is motivated by this type of concern. Second, the sanctity of my friend's death carries with it an imperative that it not be put to use in the public sphere. The resistance that a couple may feel to publish their early correspondence, though it may be of prize-winning quality, is motivated by this type of concern. Photojournalism is vulnerable to both types of concerns. The photojournalist presents human suffering in a mediated fashion and in doing so presents it to a public forum. Photojournalism is especially vulnerable to the first concern in that, unlike other art forms, its practice is contemporaneous with the occurrence of the events that it depicts. It is not only the mediated presentation of personal

events that is disturbing, but also the fact that the process that enables the mediated presentation interferes with the direct experience of the event.

(c) *Alienation*: We give meaning to our lives by means of a variety of projects. The projects range from being defined in terms of personal relations, say, living for our children, to being defined in terms of some impersonal ideal, say, living for the advancement of science. Many of our interests are placed somewhere on the continuum between these two poles. To give meaning to our lives is to combat a sense of absurdity. Thomas Nagel believes that the sense of absurdity arises from the tension between an internal and an external viewpoint.<sup>12</sup> From the viewpoint that is internal to our lives, our birth and death and everything in between seems to be of utmost importance. From the viewpoint that is external to our lives, our very existence is a mere speck in the universe. Giving meaning to our lives through personal relationships is a way of releasing the tension by modifying the internal viewpoint through spreading out the importance that we assign to our own lives. This strategy affords a sense of belonging and a capacity for empathy. Giving meaning to our lives through some impersonal ideal is a way of releasing the tension by modifying the external viewpoint through construing ourselves as components in a larger design. This strategy affords a sense of autonomy and a capacity for commitment to a greater cause. But an exclusive emphasis on either viewpoint is perilous and, like in any kind of investment, diversification is the key.<sup>13</sup>

The perils of exclusively giving meaning to our lives through personal relationships are well-known. Jocelyn Kynch and Amartya Sen report on a sociological study of South Asian rural families which has it that subjects found questions about their welfare meaningless when phrased in terms of individual welfare rather than in terms of family welfare.<sup>14</sup> This attitude stands in the way of much-needed social change to rectify large-scale intra-family inequalities that result in the malnourishment of women and female children. South Asian rural women lose their individuality and identify with their family units to such a great extent that their personal interests are smothered by the collective interests.

The perils of exclusively giving meaning to our lives through impersonal ideals are no less severe. What we come to lose on this side of the continuum is a sense of empathy and belonging. A person who structures his life around some impersonal ideal reads the world's sufferings and joys through the lenses of the ideal and in this sense is only mediately affected by them. We could bring many examples to bear on all sides of the political spectrum. Conservatives may be deeply affected by the sufferings brought forth by a crime that was committed by a repeat offender, but their affection is mediate in that it is colored by their hawkish political views on parole regulations.



Feminists may be deeply affected by the sufferings of battered wives, but their affection is mediate in that it is colored by their political views on women's oppression. Liberals may be deeply affected by the sufferings of a Jewish child who is forced to participate in a Christian ceremony in a public high school, but their affection is mediate in that it is colored by their political views on religious freedom. This type of affection is different from the direct affections that are felt by a person who gives meaning to his life through personal relations. For such a person, the empathy with the other person's suffering is direct and not filtered through some political view of the world – be it backward or enlightened.

Much of Kundera's work is motivated by an antipathy for people who structure their lives through impersonal ideals. In his first novel, *The Joke*, a note on a post-card that was meant to be humorous at an interpersonal level was read through the lenses of a culture that was fresh with socialist ideals and cost its sender many years in a labor camp.<sup>15</sup> In *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*, Kundera's phrase "The Kitsch of the Grand March" captures the lack of genuineness in ways of life that is filled in by impersonal ideals. A Czechoslovakian refugee after the Spring of Prague finds herself unable to join a demonstration in Paris against the Russian occupation in her country, because she believes that "behind all occupations and invasions lurks a more basic, pervasive evil and . . . the image of that evil was a parade of people marching by with raised fists and shouting identical syllables in unison."<sup>16</sup> Tomas refuses to sign a petition, although he does not question its cause. He responds, in reference to some earlier event in which his friend saved a crow: "It is much more important to dig a half-buried crow out of the ground . . . than to sign petitions to a president."<sup>17</sup> What Kundera hints at in these passages is that a genuine sense of empathy and a directness in experience is lost in a life in which we line ourselves up behind a banner, however much moral importance the ideal which the banner stands for may carry.

Projects that give meaning to our lives shape our desire structures. When we give meaning to our lives through some impersonal ideal, sentiments of empathy come to be conditioned by it. This is only a stepping stone toward an even worse danger. Sentiments of empathy may come to lose their grip entirely when the impersonal ideal conflicts with the sentiments that originally underlay the ideal. After *Kristallnacht* in 1938, David Ben-Gurion told a meeting of Labour Zionist leaders: "If I knew that it would be possible to save all children in Germany by bringing them over to England, and only half of them by transporting them to Eretz Israel, then I would opt for the second alternative."<sup>18</sup> Zionism as an impersonal ideal became such a motivational force for him that the sentiment of empathy with the sufferings of Jewish people in the diaspora, which originally underlay the Zionist ideal, was relegated

to secondary status. The impersonal ideal came to exert its own demands. If there was a conflict with the demands of empathy with the victims whose cause was heralded by the impersonal ideal, then the demands of empathy had to yield to the demands of the ideal. This is the breaking point at which social activism itself falls victim to alienation.

Alex reaches his breaking point with the seemingly innocent complaint that there is not much happening in the camp. His interest in photojournalism may have been spawned by a sentiment of empathy with the victims of the brutalities of war. But in pursuing the impersonal ideal of taking a stand against the war through photojournalism, the desire to document comes to take priority over the desire for a world that is maximally exempt from the brutalities of war. When bad consequences ensue, however unforeseeable, Alex distances himself from the alienating impersonal ideal of taking a stand against war through photojournalism and strives to return to a life that is driven by a genuine sense of empathy. In the words of Hannah's reproach, Alex wants to *see* his world again and does not want to be merely *watching* from the sidelines.<sup>19</sup> Upon his return to Macedonia, he learns that he cannot take sides with the Macedonian community in his village. He has acquired too much of a cosmopolitan attitude to take part in such petty rivalries. It is only in trying to save the daughter of his former Albanian girlfriend at the cost of his own life that he finds an opportunity to act out of a direct personal engagement and to break through the alienation that caused his ill-fated remark in Bosnia.

## 6. Photojournalism, Pornography, and Erotic Art

Kundera and Manchevski both hint that there is some similarity between photojournalism and the explicit depiction of nudity. These hints are both curious and arresting. What is this similarity and can it cast any light on the misgivings we may have about both photojournalism and pornography?

Remember Anna's response to a client who is complaining about an order of pornographic pictures: "How do you mean 'more immediate' – she is practically on top of you in those photographs."<sup>20</sup> There is an equivocation on the notion of immediacy here. Pornography is certainly immediate in its graphic nature. But it is not immediate in that it hides something essential about what is being depicted. It is ineffective in that its graphic nature impedes the viewer from making a phenomenal connection with what is being depicted, from making a connection with what it is like. It puts the viewer in a position comparable to the position of Nagel's scientist who has complete knowledge of the workings of sonar perception in bats, but still fails to apprehend what it is like to perceive the world as a bat does.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, the viewer becomes thoroughly acquainted with all kinds of anatomical detail, but what remains

concealed is what it is like to be engaged in such sexual licentiousness. A feeling of emptiness emanates from the paradoxical nature of pornography: the viewer feels that due to its graphicness, what is being depicted has been explored to its limits, and yet, something essential remains hidden. Herein lies the distinction between pornography and erotic art. Erotic art restricts overly graphic detail and succeeds in drawing the viewer into the phenomenal qualities of what is depicted by retaining a certain suggestive character. Pornography conceals in revealing, while erotic art reveals in concealing.

Like pornography, photojournalism typically is immediate in its graphic nature. It depicts human suffering in its most gruesome details and in doing so it conceals the phenomenal qualities of human suffering. Just as erotic art can be contrasted with pornography, I wish to contrast a better photography with the typical products of photojournalism. The children's books writer Lois Lowry talks about how, when she would be asked to cover a catastrophe, she would see all the horrors but "would write about a broken lunch box lying shattered in a puddle."<sup>22</sup> We can easily imagine a photograph capturing such a moment. Or, there is the horrific photograph by Dirk Reinartz of an extremely well-organized office with prisoners' files in the Small Fort in Terezin, Theresienstadt, suggesting the systematic character of the extermination policies during the holocaust.<sup>23</sup> The lack of immediacy about the portrayal of suffering pulls the viewer in to a much greater extent than the more gruesome scenes that are so typical in photojournalism.

But to point to an analogy in the paradoxical features of pornography and photojournalism is not to explain the paradox. Why is it that graphic depictions of erotic joys and war-time sufferings hamper phenomenal access, whereas more subtle portrayals invite phenomenal access? This is a difficult question and I merely wish to make some suggestive remarks that may be worth pondering.

First, a phenomenal connection between viewer and the depicted subject is most successfully created through what is familiar to the viewer. The viewer can only come to share in the experience if he can in some way relate to the experience. Crushed lunch boxes and veiled nudity may exert a greater pull on the suburban imagination than severed limbs and voluptuous poses.

Second, to elicit a phenomenal impression, a representation which leaves something to the imagination is more successful than a representation which tells all. If you want to whet someone's appetite, it is better to let her smell the food than to let her smell, see and touch the food. There is a fine line here. The representation should be sufficiently thin such that it remains suggestive, yet it should be sufficiently thick such that it compels the imagination. It is this fine line that photographs of crushed lunch boxes and veiled nudity strive for in conveying war-time sufferings and erotic pleasures.

Third, immediacy engages the viewer into a shameful gaze. Leontius in Plato's *Republic* is both tempted and repelled to look at the corpses. When he gives in to the temptation and allows his eyes "to feast on this lovely sight," the seeing occurs in mental anguish, which obstructs the possibility that he will develop a phenomenal connection with the suffering.<sup>24</sup> There can be no *Einlebung* in the presence of shame. Pornography and photojournalism suffer from the same ineffectiveness.

## 7. Conclusion

It was not my intention to make a case against photojournalism. Instead, I have tried to give a clear voice to the sort of qualms we might have about photojournalism. But this is not to say that in each instance the scales will tip to the side of these qualms. To speak with Larry Burrows, sometimes penetrating the hearts of those at home vindicates our capitalizing on other men's grief.<sup>25</sup> Photojournalism's role as a catalyst for social change does give it a certain license. But in learning about what kind of values there are on the other side of the scale, we come to understand that there are certain restraints to this license. Understanding those restraints makes for a more respectful and a more powerful photojournalism.<sup>26</sup>

## Notes

1. Edmund Dene Morel, *Red Rubber – The Story of the Rubber Slave Trade Flourishing on the Congo in the Year of Grace 1906* (New York: Negro University Press, 1969 [1906]).
2. Mark Twain, *King Leopold's Soliloqui* (New York: International Publishers, 1961 [1905]), p. 73.
3. Quoted in Joel Dyer, "The War for Truth," in the *Colorado Daily*, May 1996.
4. Milan Kundera, *The Unbearable Lightness of Being* (New York: Harper, 1984), p. 142.
5. *Before the Rain* (1994). British-Macedonian coproduction, written and directed by Milcho Manchevski.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. Milan Kundera, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
10. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* II–IIae, Q. 64, art 8.
11. *Ibid.* I followed the translation of the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1947) and substituted the first person plural for the indefinite third person singular.
12. Thomas Nagel, "The Absurd," in *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 11–23; and *The View from Nowhere* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 214–223.

13. A call for diversification does not weaken the force of the dignity or sanctity principles. We are advised to find a balance between giving meaning to our lives through personal relationships and through impersonal ideals. The dignity and sanctity principles can play an important role in our lives because we strongly identify with the impersonal ideal of being committed to respect for dignity and sanctity. But they can play an equally important role in our lives because we strongly identify with our personal relationships, and we let these relationships be guided by respect for dignity and sanctity. This can be done without identifying with the impersonal ideal of being committed to respect for dignity and sanctity. Hence, respect for dignity and sanctity can be strongly present in either strategy for giving meaning to our lives and, of course, equally so in a diversified strategy.
14. Jocelyn Kynch and Amartya Sen, "Indian Women: Well-being and Survival," in *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 7 (1983): 364. See also Amartya Sen, "Family and Food: Sex Bias in Poverty," in T.N. Srinivasan and P.K. Bardhan eds. *Rural Poverty in South East Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 466–468. The reference is to V. Das and R. Nicholas, 'Welfare' and 'Well-being' in *South Asian Societies* (New York: ACLS-SSRC joint committee on South Asia, SSRC, 1981).
15. Milan Kundera, *The Joke*, trans. David Hamblyn and Oliver Stallybrass. (London: Macdonald, 1969).
16. Milan Kundera, *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*, p. 100.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 219–220.
18. Lenni Brenner, *Zionism in the Age of the Dictators* (Beckenham, England: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 149. The original source is the *Labor Party Archive* (*archion mefeget ha'avoda*), file 23/28.
19. Cf. note 6.
20. Cf. note 7.
21. Thomas Nagel, "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" in *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 164–180.
22. Lois Lowry, "Newbery Medal Acceptance," in *The Horn Book Magazine*, July/August, 1990, p. 416.
23. Dirk Reinartz and Christian Graf von Krockow, *Deathly Still*, trans. Ishbel Flett (New York: Scalo, 1995), p. 181.
24. Plato, *The Republic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 137.
25. Cf. note 3.
26. I am grateful to Erik Anderson, Yosef Grozinsky, Alon Harel, Iain Martel, Roland Rance, Christopher Shields, Clark Wolf, the editor and an anonymous referee of the *Journal of Value Inquiry*, and especially to Claudia Mills for their inspiration, suggestions or references.